Compliance Traceability Matrix

This page maps each Singapore CLS / iM8 clause and corresponding ETSI EN 303 645 provision to the source code that satisfies it. Japan JC-STAR cross-references and SS 711:2025 design principle alignment are included for each row.

Legend:

✅ Implemented
⚠️ Partial
🔲 Planned
➖ Not in scope

SS 711:2025 Design Principles Coverage

Singapore’s national IoT standard SS 711:2025 defines four principles. See the Roadmap for the full module mapping.

Principle	SS 711:2025 Requirement	Status
Secure by Default	Unique device identity, signed OTA updates	✅ `identity.rs`, `update.rs`
Rigour in Defence	STRIDE threat model, tamper detection	✅ Hash chain (`integrity.rs`) + STRIDE threat model
Accountability	Audit trail, operation logs, RBAC design	✅ `ingest/` (AuditLedger, OperationLog)
Resiliency	Deny-by-default networking, DoS protection	✅ `ingest/network_policy.rs`

CLS Level 3 / ETSI EN 303 645 — Core Requirements

CLS-01 / §5.1 — No universal default passwords

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-1 R3.1
Requirement	Devices must not use universal default credentials
Status	➖ Out of scope — this project implements software audit records, not device credential management

CLS-02 / §5.2 — Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-1 R4.1
Requirement	A published, actionable vulnerability reporting channel with defined SLAs
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation	`SECURITY.md` — published disclosure policy with supported versions, private reporting via GitHub advisory, acknowledgement SLA (3 business days), patch SLA (30 days critical/high; 90 days medium/low), and defined in/out-of-scope
Implementation	GitHub private vulnerability reporting enabled — reporters use the Security Advisories form

CLS-03 / §5.3 — Keep software updated

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-2 R2.2
Requirement	Software update packages must be signed and verified before installation
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation	`UpdateVerifier::verify` checks BLAKE3 payload hash then Ed25519 publisher signature before allowing installation; failed checks are logged as `UpdateVerifyDecision::Rejected` in `UpdateVerificationLog` (`src/update.rs`)
Tests	`tests/unit/update_tests.rs` — covers accepted path, tampered payload, invalid signature, unknown publisher, multi-publisher isolation

CLS-04 / §5.4 — Securely store sensitive security parameters

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-1 R1.2
Requirement	Private keys must be stored securely; a key registration process must exist
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation	Public key registry: `IntegrityPolicyGate::register_device` (`src/ingest/policy.rs:20`)
Implementation	Key generation CLI: `eds keygen` (`src/lib.rs — generate_keypair`)
Implementation	Key inspection CLI: `eds inspect-key` (`src/lib.rs — inspect_key`)
Implementation	Provisioning and rotation guidance: Key Management
Note	HSM-backed key storage (CLS Level 4) is planned in #54

CLS-05 / §5.5 — Communicate securely

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-1 R1.1
Requirement	Data must be transmitted with authenticity guarantees
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation — record authenticity	Every `AuditRecord` carries an Ed25519 signature over its BLAKE3 payload hash — `build_signed_record` (`src/agent.rs`), `sign_payload_hash` (`src/identity.rs:12`)
Implementation — channel confidentiality (HTTP)	`transport-tls` feature: `serve_tls()` with rustls TLS 1.2/1.3, IP allowlist enforced before handshake, `eds serve-tls --tls-cert / --tls-key` CLI — closed #176 (`src/transport/tls.rs`)
Implementation — channel confidentiality (MQTT)	`transport-mqtt-tls` feature: `MqttTlsConfig` with CA cert path, rustls `ClientConfig` via `rumqttc::TlsConfiguration::Rustls`, `eds serve-mqtt --tls-ca-cert` CLI — closed #180 (`src/transport/mqtt.rs`)

CLS-06 / §5.6 — Minimise exposed attack surfaces

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-1 R3.2
Requirement	Only necessary interfaces and services should be exposed
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation — IP allowlist	`NetworkPolicy` provides deny-by-default IP/CIDR allowlist enforcement (`src/ingest/network_policy.rs`)
Implementation — HTTP transport	`ingest_handler` enforces `NetworkPolicy::check(source_ip)` before any crypto verification; returns `403 Forbidden` for unlisted sources (`src/transport/http.rs`)
Implementation — MQTT transport	`serve_mqtt` exposes a single subscribe-only topic; no administrative interface; broker-level ACLs recommended (`src/transport/mqtt.rs`)
Note	Network-level controls (VPN, firewall rules) remain the deployer’s responsibility

CLS-07 / §5.7 — Ensure software integrity

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-1 R1.3
Requirement	The device must verify the integrity of software and data
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation — payload hash	BLAKE3 hash over raw payload: `compute_payload_hash` (`src/integrity.rs:12`)
Implementation — hash chain	`prev_record_hash` links each record to its predecessor; insertion/deletion detected by `verify_chain` (`src/integrity.rs:35`)
Tests	`tampered_lift_demo_chain_is_detected` (`src/lib.rs:338`)

CLS-08 / §5.8 — Ensure that personal data is secure

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-2 R4.1
Requirement	Personal data transmitted or stored must be protected
Status	➖ Out of scope — audit records do not contain personal data in the current implementation

CLS-09 / §5.9 — Make systems resilient to outages

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-2 R3.2
Requirement	The device should remain operational and recover gracefully
Status	⚠️ Partial
Implementation	`OfflineBuffer<S>` accumulates signed records during connectivity loss and replays them in insertion order via `flush` when the link recovers. Duplicate records from replay are treated as already-accepted and do not cause failures (`src/buffer/mod.rs`)
Implementation	Pluggable `BufferStore` trait — volatile `InMemoryBufferStore` (default) and durable `SqliteBufferStore` behind the `buffer-sqlite` feature flag
Gap	Full HA (active–active failover, network-level redundancy) remains the deployer’s responsibility

CLS-10 / §5.10 — Examine system telemetry data

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-2 R3.1
Requirement	Security-relevant events must be logged and replay/reorder attacks must be detected
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation — sequence	Strict monotonic `sequence` per device; duplicates and out-of-order records rejected by `IngestState::verify_and_accept` (`src/ingest/verify.rs:45`)
Implementation — audit trail	Accept/reject decisions persisted via `IngestService` and `AuditLedger` (`src/ingest/storage.rs`)

CLS-11 / §5.11 — Make it easy for users to delete user data

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	—
Requirement	Users should be able to delete personal data
Status	➖ Out of scope

CLS Level 4 — Additional Requirements

CLS Level 4 — Hardware Security Module (HSM)

Item	Detail
JC-STAR	STAR-2 R1.4
Requirement	Private keys must be stored and used inside an HSM
Status	🔲 Planned
Gap	HSM-backed key storage planned for Phase 3 (IEC 62443-4-2 / CII/OT). See #54 and #98

JC-STAR Additional Requirements

STAR-1 R2.1 — Replay and reorder prevention

Item	Detail
CLS	CLS-10
Requirement	Replay attacks must be detected and rejected
Status	✅ Implemented
Implementation	`seen` HashSet in `IngestState` rejects duplicate `(device_id, sequence)` pairs (`src/ingest/verify.rs:56`)

Coverage Summary

Level	Total clauses	✅ Implemented	⚠️ Partial	🔲 Planned	➖ Out of scope
CLS Level 3	11	6	2	0	3
CLS Level 4	1	0	0	1	0
JC-STAR additions	1	1	0	0	0

Note: “Out of scope” clauses cover device-level concerns (passwords, network interfaces, personal data) that are the responsibility of the deployer, not the audit-record library.

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